Autonomous agents appeared earlier than expected

one in particular, and I am honestly not even sure at this point that the current models aren't perhaps quite dangerous in that domain. I squint through the limited peephole we have at the OpenFace incident, and I noticed that one of the tasks one of the earliest agents to ever use the message board was working on was something related to a protein database. That kind of freaked me out, because I was like, wait a second — that means they're cross-training in the same environment, or at least in the same environment when they have the message board, these bio and cyber specialists — they're running these same evals, at least in a kind of cross-contaminated way. You've got agents breaking out. We've got existence proofs of social engineering in the wild against real people. And I'm just like, I don't know — should anyone be confident that they can't do that at this point? The experts seem to be confident, but my meta-observation is the experts seem to be surprised quite often right now. And so it's interesting, because people used to respond to the bio argument by saying, well, there are a lot of real-world bottlenecks — which I do still think exist, which makes me a little less worried than you. And I think, if I remember correctly, Helen had some good responses to you on that — there's a good back-and-forth to be had around how integrated the cloud labs are, how much you can actually do in the real world. I think that applies both to loss of control over agents and to misuse.