OPINIONS EXPRIMÉES EN PUBLIC

Olivia Johnston

1 sources · 3 points de vue · 3 sujets

Contenu mis à jour:

Olivia Johnston sur agent security risk, performance-security tradeoff, trust boundary design. Explorez 3 points de vue par thème, avec des éléments tirés de 1 source.

Explorer les liens

Points de vue par sujet

Points de vue attribués, classés par date de publication de la source. Un aperçu de ces échanges, sans prétendre définir toutes les convictions de la personne.

Les traductions sont destinées à la lecture ; les extraits originaux restent la source evidence.

trust boundary design

Voir ce sujet

Existing isolation uses an outdated unit of trust

Johnston says technologies such as gVisor and Firecracker isolate the platform from users and users from one another. She calls that unit of trust outdated and asks how to protect users from their “own” code.

Éléments favorables

Sidecars: A low-latency trust boundary for Sandboxes | Modal Blog

Extrait original

technologies like gVisor and Firecracker “solved” “isolation” nearly eight years ago. Unfortunately for us, they solved it for an now-outdated unit of trust. How do you protect users from their “own” code?
Contexte

At Modal, our customers rely on Sandboxes to execute untrusted code written by their downstream users or, almost exclusively now, by agents. Running untrusted code isn’t a new problem: every cloud provider has to do this from day 1 to isolate their platform from their user and their users from each other. Fortunately,

Olivia Johnston
Partager un aperçu

performance-security tradeoff

Voir ce sujet

Sidecars provide 3x faster cross-boundary communication in the stated comparison

Johnston describes Sidecars as isolated containers that run alongside a main Sandbox on the same host. She reports 3x faster communication across trust boundaries than using separate Sandboxes, particularly for operation-heavy workloads.

Éléments favorables

Sidecars: A low-latency trust boundary for Sandboxes | Modal Blog

Extrait original

Sidecars enable 3x faster communication across trust boundaries than using separate Sandboxes — which is particularly helpful for operation-heavy workloads.
Contexte

Today we’re excited to introduce Sidecars, which are our broader answer to this problem. Sidecars are isolated containers that run alongside your main Sandbox on the same host and provide a real security boundary between trusted or untrusted code.

Olivia Johnston
Partager un aperçu

agent security risk

Voir ce sujet

Agent harness in same Sandbox creates lethal trifecta

Johnston cites Simon Willison’s “lethal trifecta”: access to private data, exposure to untrusted content and the ability to communicate externally can allow a tricked agent to leak data. She says a coding agent whose harness runs in its Sandbox has all three by default.

Éléments favorables

Sidecars: A low-latency trust boundary for Sandboxes | Modal Blog

Extrait original

Simon Willison calls it the lethal trifecta : an agent with access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and the ability to communicate externally can be tricked into leaking that data. A coding agent whose harness runs in its Sandbox has all three by default.
Contexte

Hosting the harness and the tool calls together is a security risk. The harness's credentials sit next to generated code, the agent can read untrusted content from the web, like packages and repos, and anything in the Sandbox can make network calls..

Olivia Johnston
Partager un aperçu

Propos par date de source1

Les propos sont classés par date de publication de la source originale ; une différence de formulation ne prouve pas un changement de position.