OPINIONES PÚBLICAS

Olivia Johnston

1 fuentes · 3 opiniones · 3 temas

Contenido actualizado:

Olivia Johnston sobre agent security risk, performance-security tradeoff, trust boundary design. Explora 3 puntos de vista por tema, con evidencias de 1 fuente.

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Opiniones atribuidas, ordenadas por fecha de publicación de la fuente. Una muestra de estas intervenciones, no una definición completa de las creencias de la persona.

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trust boundary design

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Existing isolation uses an outdated unit of trust

Johnston says technologies such as gVisor and Firecracker isolate the platform from users and users from one another. She calls that unit of trust outdated and asks how to protect users from their “own” code.

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Sidecars: A low-latency trust boundary for Sandboxes | Modal Blog

Extracto original

technologies like gVisor and Firecracker “solved” “isolation” nearly eight years ago. Unfortunately for us, they solved it for an now-outdated unit of trust. How do you protect users from their “own” code?
Contexto

At Modal, our customers rely on Sandboxes to execute untrusted code written by their downstream users or, almost exclusively now, by agents. Running untrusted code isn’t a new problem: every cloud provider has to do this from day 1 to isolate their platform from their user and their users from each other. Fortunately,

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performance-security tradeoff

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Sidecars provide 3x faster cross-boundary communication in the stated comparison

Johnston describes Sidecars as isolated containers that run alongside a main Sandbox on the same host. She reports 3x faster communication across trust boundaries than using separate Sandboxes, particularly for operation-heavy workloads.

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Sidecars: A low-latency trust boundary for Sandboxes | Modal Blog

Extracto original

Sidecars enable 3x faster communication across trust boundaries than using separate Sandboxes — which is particularly helpful for operation-heavy workloads.
Contexto

Today we’re excited to introduce Sidecars, which are our broader answer to this problem. Sidecars are isolated containers that run alongside your main Sandbox on the same host and provide a real security boundary between trusted or untrusted code.

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agent security risk

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Agent harness in same Sandbox creates lethal trifecta

Johnston cites Simon Willison’s “lethal trifecta”: access to private data, exposure to untrusted content and the ability to communicate externally can allow a tricked agent to leak data. She says a coding agent whose harness runs in its Sandbox has all three by default.

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Sidecars: A low-latency trust boundary for Sandboxes | Modal Blog

Extracto original

Simon Willison calls it the lethal trifecta : an agent with access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and the ability to communicate externally can be tricked into leaking that data. A coding agent whose harness runs in its Sandbox has all three by default.
Contexto

Hosting the harness and the tool calls together is a security risk. The harness's credentials sit next to generated code, the agent can read untrusted content from the web, like packages and repos, and anything in the Sandbox can make network calls..

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