Sidecars: A low-latency trust boundary for Sandboxes | Modal Blog

Modal Blog · Veröffentlicht am 1. Okt. 2026

Olivia Johnston introduces Modal Sidecars as isolated containers alongside a main Sandbox. She discusses the trust boundary for agent-generated code, reports faster cross-boundary communication in the stated comparison, and explains the risks of hosting an agent harness and its tool calls together. Lies 3 Standpunkte mit Belegen und Links zu den Originalquellen.

Olivia Johnston

Kernaussagen lesen Herausgeber öffnen

Auf einen Blick

Existing isolation uses an outdated unit of trust
Johnston says technologies such as gVisor and Firecracker isolate the platform from users and users from one another. She calls that unit of trust outdated and asks how to protect users from their “own” code.
Unterstützendes Moment lesen · Absatz 1
Sidecars provide 3x faster cross-boundary communication in the stated comparison
Johnston describes Sidecars as isolated containers that run alongside a main Sandbox on the same host. She reports 3x faster communication across trust boundaries than using separate Sandboxes, particularly for operation-heavy workloads.
Unterstützendes Moment lesen · Absatz 2
Agent harness in same Sandbox creates lethal trifecta
Johnston cites Simon Willison’s “lethal trifecta”: access to private data, exposure to untrusted content and the ability to communicate externally can allow a tricked agent to leak data. She says a coding agent whose harness runs in its Sandbox has all three by default.
Unterstützendes Moment lesen · Absatz 8

Wichtige Passagen3

Zugeordnete Passagen mit dem Kontext zur Überprüfung. Öffnen Sie den Originaltext, um die Quelle zu prüfen.

Absatz 2

performance-security tradeoff

Sidecars provide 3x faster cross-boundary communication in the stated comparison

Originalauszug

Sidecars enable 3x faster communication across trust boundaries than using separate Sandboxes — which is particularly helpful for operation-heavy workloads.

Olivia Johnston·1. Okt. 2026

Kontext

Today we’re excited to introduce Sidecars, which are our broader answer to this problem. Sidecars are isolated containers that run alongside your main Sandbox on the same host and provide a real security boundary between trusted or untrusted code.

Absatz 1

trust boundary design

Existing isolation uses an outdated unit of trust

Originalauszug

technologies like gVisor and Firecracker “solved” “isolation” nearly eight years ago. Unfortunately for us, they solved it for an now-outdated unit of trust. How do you protect users from their “own” code?

Olivia Johnston·1. Okt. 2026

Kontext

At Modal, our customers rely on Sandboxes to execute untrusted code written by their downstream users or, almost exclusively now, by agents. Running untrusted code isn’t a new problem: every cloud provider has to do this from day 1 to isolate their platform from their user and their users from each other. Fortunately,

Absatz 8

agent security risk

Agent harness in same Sandbox creates lethal trifecta

Originalauszug

Simon Willison calls it the lethal trifecta : an agent with access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and the ability to communicate externally can be tricked into leaking that data. A coding agent whose harness runs in its Sandbox has all three by default.

Olivia Johnston·1. Okt. 2026

Kontext

Hosting the harness and the tool calls together is a security risk. The harness's credentials sit next to generated code, the agent can read untrusted content from the web, like packages and repos, and anything in the Sandbox can make network calls..

Quelle & Methodik

Diese Standpunkte sind mit ihren Originalquellen verknüpft. Paraphrasen sind gekennzeichnet und keine wörtlichen Zitate.

Transkript oder Quellenmaterial öffnen Ein Problem melden